Valid until
9.30.2022

RoboRAVE International
A Collaborative Robotics Program

RoboEthics Challenge Rules

Goal

Prepare two (2) opposing, publically researched, yet fluid arguments that can be used to debate the ethics of a question that is connected to the world of robotics & coding.

Who Can Play

Teams, **two (2) members only,** in this challenge compete as **one division**, typically:

- High School + University/Professional (HS & UP)
- This challenge is limited to **a number of** fully-registered teams determined by each event director(s)
- This challenge is official **once** 4 teams are fully registered

Requirements

- The 2021 Topic: *"Misinformation – Influenced or Not?"*
- Each 2 person team will have arguments for both Pro (Government) **and** Con (Opposition) positions

General Rules

- The purpose of this challenge is to learn from each other how to enhance our community's understanding for the topic's ethical complexities.
- During the arguments, teams need to listen to the opposing positions and be able to prepare counter-arguments during their response times.
- During off time, it is important to continue your research for the next round of debates; in other words, keep improving your points as the challenge progresses.
- The Challenge will be in three stages (eg. 16 teams entered):
    - **Stage 1:** All Teams will present 4 rounds; 2 as PRO, 2 as OPP
      Qualifying rounds
        - Pro AND Opp positions presented twice.
        - Scores, as given by the judges, for 4 debates determines top 8 teams for Stage 2

    - **Stage 2:**Top 8 Teams will present 2 debates; 1 PRO, 1 OPP
      Semi Final Debates

Pro	Opp		Pro	Opp
T1	T2		T8	T1
T3	T4		T6	T3
T5	T6		T4	T5
T7	T8		T2	T7

    - **Stage 3:** Top 4 Teams will present 2 debates; 1 PRO, 1 OPP
      Final Debates

1st debate	Team 1 - Team 4	Team 1 is PRO; 4 is OPP
2nd debate	Team 2 - Team 3	Team 2 is PRO; 3 is OPP
3rd debate	Team 1 - Team 3	Team 3 is PRO; 1 is OPP
4th debate	Team 2 - Team 4	Team 4 is PRO; 2 is OPP

- Procedures are modeled on the American Parliamentary Debate Association (APDA) with MORE

emphasis placed on teaching each other debate skills and content knowledge;
- Focus on being COLLABORATIVE ***vs.*** winning.
- Judges will score each team based on being persuaded by the support within your argument(s).
- Team scores will be used to select the teams advancing on to the next Stage.

NOT Allowed: support materials such as videos, photos, charts, and other audio/visuals

Taking notes is strongly recommended during the debates

Challenge Specifics

We are adopting/modifying the American Parliamentary Debate Association's (APDA) format for rules and judging. The rules are NOT being applied 100% so we can use the challenge as a dynamic learning experience.
More information is available at http://apdaweb.org/guide/judging

All debate times are shortened for our challenge than what is shown in the APDA rules.
NOTE: Important to understand – All new arguments may be made ONLY during the first four (4) speaking times. The final two (2) speakers during Summary, may only summarize and NOT introduce any NEW material.

After the PRO and OPP sides are selected, the team members are free to change who is their lead & support

- PRO - Prime Minister opens, **in favor**, of topic (3 minutes)
- CON- Opposition Leader follows, **in opposition to the PRO, countering their points** (3 minutes)
- PRO - Pro member, **in favor, in support of Prime Minister, countering OPP points** (3 minutes)
- CON - Opposition member, **in opposition, in support of OPP leader, countering PRO** (3 minutes)
- **SUMMARY** - NO new information is to be introduced by the **last** two speakers
- CON - Opposition Leader, **in summary of OPP best points, and PRO weakest points** (4 minutes)
- PRO - Prime Minister, **in summary of PRO best points, and OPP weakest points** (4 minutes)

Scoring

NOTE #1: Scoring of one's debate is PRIMARILY SUBJECTIVE; Judge's may differ widely during the Judges' conference time (directly AFTER each full debate ends). During this conference, judges present their scoring and why. Debate continues until there is consensus on who was the strongest team. IT is possible that during the conference, a team with the higher score is lowered, while a team with a lower score is raised. The JUDGE's CONFERENCE is where the final decision is made.

The Judge's Conference size: minimum of 2; maximum of 5 with 1 judge selected as the Judge's Chair.

Judge Chair reports the final score and comments for improvement; Other judges are free to provide additional comments at the discretion of the Chair

NOTE #2: Comments are expected from at least the Judge Chair. Remember: Your feedback is VERY important to help teams improve, in the short term, as well as for the long term.

Our scoring format is unique to this event.

- Judges will score each team's argument guided ***in part*** with APDA guidelines and ***in part*** by their own judging experience
- Each speaker's score **(x)** will range between **5.00 ≤ x ≤ 10.00 per presentation**
    - **The PRIME Minister & Opposition Leader will be heard twice during each debate**
    - **The Pro & Opposition Supporter will be heard once during each debate**
- Team;s total score will be in the range of **15.00 ≤ x ≤ 30.00 per full debate**
- If a team is a NO SHOW,
    - Team present receives a **median score of 22.50**
    - NO SHOW team will be awarded **0.00**
- IF BOTH teams are NO SHOWs,
    - Both will receive the score of **0.00**

- Sum of all debate points per Stage determines team ranking
    - Stage 1, team scores will range between **60.00 ≤ x ≤ 120.00**
    - Stage 2 AND 3 scores will range between **30.00 ≤ x ≤ 60.00**
- Judges listen for:
    - Consistency
    - Accuracy
    - Persuasiveness
    - Depth of knowledge
    - Logic, flow and structure
    - Sources cited
    - Ability to defend and/or counter an opponent's case
    - Eloquence of presentational style
    - Non-personal attacks
    - Observing the time limit for each speaker
    - Use of speaking space

Reading Resources for Beginning Your Background Knowledge

2021-22 RoboEthics RESOURCES for Misinformation - Influenced or Not?

Sources to start with but limited to use

Google - Cybersecurity & Misinformation - you'll be overwhelmed…

Specific sources:

Sustainable Society Network

WORKING PAPERS OF THE SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY NETWORK+
Vol. 3
February 2015

https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:d8624c6f-c4af-477c-928a-92b74c3a9eb9/download_file?file_format=pdf&safe_filename=CSSS2015-Information%252BTrustworthiness%252BMisinformation%252BProblems2.pdf&type_of_work=Conference+item

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International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis

CIC Canadian International Council Conseil International du Canada

Cybersecurity and its discontents: Artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things, and digital misinformation
Alex S WilnerFirst Published July 26, 2018 Research Article

https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702018782496
Article information

Abstract

The future of cybersecurity is in flux. Artificial intelligence challenges existing notions of security, human rights, and governance. Digital misinformation campaigns leverage fabrications and mistruths for political and geostrategic gain. And the Internet of Things—a digital landscape in which billions of wireless objects from smart fridges to smart cars are tethered together—provides new means to distribute and conduct cyberattacks. As technological developments alter the way we think about cybersecurity, they will likewise broaden the way governments and societies will have to learn to respond. This policy brief discusses the emerging landscape of cybersecurity in Canada and abroad, with the intent of informing public debate and discourse on emerging cyber challenges and opportunities.

Publication:WSDM '18: Proceedings of the Eleventh ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data MiningFebruary 2018 Pages 799–800https://doi.org/10.1145/3159652.3160597

WSDM '18: Proceedings of the Eleventh ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining

MIS2: Misinformation and Misbehavior Mining on the Web

BSTRACT

Misinformation and misbehavior mining on the web(MIS2) workshop is held in Los Angeles, California, USA on February 9, 2018, and co-located with the 11th ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining(WSDM 2018). Web is a dynamic ecosystem that enables malicious users to create and spread deceptive information to a wide audience in a matter of minutes. These malicious actors work on a wide variety of platforms, such as social media, e-commerce, and more. The main object of MIS2 is to discuss new and upcoming research on modeling, discovery, detection, and mitigation methods of misbehavior and misinformation on the web. MIS2 is an interdisciplinary venue for leading researchers and practitioners from the areas of data mining, social network analysis, cybersecurity, communications, human-computer interaction, and natural language processing. The topics addressed in MIS2 are extremely timely and the research presented by refereed papers and invited keynote speakers will participants a full dose of emerging research.

References

Alex Beutel, Wanhong Xu, Venkatesan Guruswami, Christopher Palow, and Christos Faloutsos. 2013. CopyCatch: stopping group attacks by spotting lockstep behavior in social networks Proceedings of the 22rd International Conference on World Wide Web. ACM

Explicit warnings reduce but do not eliminate the continued influence of misinformation

- Ullrich K. H. Ecker,
- Stephan Lewandowsky &
- David T. W. Tang

Abstract

Information that initially is presumed to be correct, but that is later retracted or corrected, often continues to influence memory and reasoning. This occurs even if the retraction itself is well remembered. The present study investigated

whether the continued influence of misinformation can be reduced by explicitly warning people at the outset that they may be misled. A specific warning— giving detailed information about the continued influence effect (CIE)—succeeded in reducing the continued reliance on outdated information but did not eliminate it. A more general warning—reminding people that facts are not always properly checked before information is disseminated—was even less effective. In an additional experiment, a specific warning was combined with the provision of a plausible alternative explanation for the retracted information. This combined manipulation further reduced the CIE but still failed to eliminate it altogether.

A Meta-Analytic Examination of the Continued Influence of Misinformation in the Face of Correction: How Powerful Is It, Why Does It Happen, and How to Stop It?

Nathan Walter, Riva Tukachinsky

First Published June 22, 2019 Research Article

https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650219854600

Abstract

A meta-analysis was conducted to examine the extent of continued influence of misinformation in the face of correction and the theoretical explanations of this phenomenon. Aggregation of results from 32 studies (N = 6,527) revealed that, on average, correction does not entirely eliminate the effect of misinformation (r = –.05, p = .045). Corrective messages were found to be more successful when they are coherent, consistent with the audience's worldview, and delivered by the source of the misinformation itself. Corrections are less effective if the misinformation was attributed to a credible source, the misinformation has been repeated multiple times prior to correction, or when there was a time lag between the delivery of the misinformation and the correction. These findings are consistent with predictions based on theories of mental models and offer concrete recommendations for practitioners.

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Fighting misinformation on social media using crowdsourced judgments of news source quality

Gordon Pennycook and David G. Rand

PNAS February 12, 2019 116 (7) 2521-2526; first published January 28, 2019
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1806781116

1. Edited by Susan T. Fiske, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, and approved December 17, 2018 (received for review April 19, 2018)

Significance

Many people consume news via social media. It is therefore desirable to reduce social media users' exposure to low-quality news content. One possible intervention is for social media ranking algorithms to show relatively less content from sources that users deem to be untrustworthy. But are laypeople's judgments reliable indicators of quality, or are they corrupted by either partisan bias or lack of information? Perhaps surprisingly, we find that laypeople—on average—are quite good at distinguishing between lower- and higher-quality sources. These results indicate that incorporating the trust ratings of laypeople into social media ranking algorithms may prove an effective intervention against misinformation, fake news, and news content with heavy political bias.

Abstract

Reducing the spread of misinformation, especially on social media, is a major challenge. We investigate one potential approach: having social media platform algorithms preferentially display content from news sources that

users rate as trustworthy. To do so, we ask whether crowdsourced trust ratings can effectively differentiate more versus less reliable sources. We ran two preregistered experiments (n = 1,010 from Mechanical Turk and n = 970 from Lucid) where individuals rated familiarity with, and trust in, 60 news sources from three categories: (*i*) mainstream media outlets, (*ii*) hyperpartisan websites, and (*iii*) websites that produce blatantly false content ("fake news"). Despite substantial partisan differences, we find that laypeople across the political spectrum rated mainstream sources as far more trustworthy than either hyperpartisan or fake news sources. Although this difference was larger for Democrats than Republicans—mostly due to distrust of mainstream sources by Republicans—every mainstream source (with one exception) was rated as more trustworthy than every hyperpartisan or fake news source across both studies when equally weighting ratings of Democrats and Republicans. Furthermore, politically balanced layperson ratings were strongly correlated (r = 0.90) with ratings provided by professional fact-checkers. We also found that, particularly among liberals, individuals higher in cognitive reflection were better able to discern between low- and high-quality sources. Finally, we found that excluding ratings from participants who were not familiar with a given news source dramatically reduced the effectiveness of the crowd. Our findings indicate that having algorithms up-rank content from trusted media outlets may be a promising approach for fighting the spread of misinformation on social media.